Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that (...) intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: Our mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is. (shrink)

In a recent paper, a “distance” function, $\cal D$ , was defined which measures the distance between pure classical and quantum systems. In this work, we present a new definition of a “distance”, D, which measures the distance between either pure or impure classical and quantum states. We also compare the new distance formula with the previous formula, when the latter is applicable. To illustrate these distances, we have used 2 × 2 matrix examples and two-dimensional vectors for simplicity and (...) clarity. Several specific examples are calculated. (shrink)

It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...) visual illusion, illusory line motion, was presented and participants were requested to make judgments that reflected what they were aware of. The participants were able to make responses indicating that they were aware of the actual stimulus in some conditions, but only of the illusion in others. This finding supports a claim that the difference between the Orwellian and Stalinesque accounts may be empirically observable, and that both types of events may occur depending on task and stimulus parameters. (shrink)

The problem of free will arises because of the conflict between two inconsistent impulses, the experience of freedom and the conviction of determinism. Perhaps we can resolve these by examining neurobiological correlates of the experience of freedom. If free will is not to be an illusion, it must have a corresponding neurobiological reality. An explanation of this issue leads us to an account of rationality and the self, as well as how consciousness can move bodies at all. I explore two (...) hypotheses. On the first, freedom is a complete illusion. On the second, it is not an illusion, and there is a corresponding indeterminism at the neurobiological level. This can only occur if there is in fact a quantum mechanical element in the fundamental neurobiology of consciousness. (shrink)

Throughout the history of the study of man there has been a fundamental opposition between those who believe that progress is to be made by a rigorous observation of man's actual behavior and those who believe that such observations are interesting only in so far as they reveal to us hidden and possibly fairly mysterious underlying laws that only partially and in distorted form reveal themselves to us in behavior. Freud, for example, is in the latter class, most of American (...) social science in the former. (shrink)

Anne Conway disagrees with substance dualism, the thesis that minds and bodies differ in nature or essence. Instead, she holds that “the distinction between spirit and body is only modal and incremental, not essential and substantial”. Yet several of her arguments against dualism have little force against the Cartesian, since they rely on premises no Cartesian would accept. In this paper, I show that Conway does have at least one powerful objection to substance dualism, drawn from premises that Descartes seems (...) bound to accept. She argues that two substances differ in nature only if they differ in their “original and peculiar” cause ; yet all created substances have the same original and peculiar cause; so, all created substances have the same nature. As I argue, the Cartesian is under a surprising amount of pressure to accept Conway’s argument, since its key premise is motivated by a conception of substance similar to one endorsed by Descartes in his Principles of Philosophy. (shrink)

Lewis white beck's "a commentary on kant's critique of practical reason" overlooks the fact that some of the ideas most important to kant's ethics are not presented in the second "critique". It also lacks a necessary emphasis on the notion of the highest good, The unifying theme of the work as a whole. The author traces the role of this concept throughout the second "critique" and shows how kant developed the content of the idea of the highest good in the (...) combined notions of perfection as the moral good and happiness as the natural good. (staff). (shrink)

Using philosophical and theological reflection, this book explores the rational grounding for Christian faith, inquiring into the basis for believing the Christian revelation, and using the answers to give an account of Christian faith itself. Setting the discussion in the context of the history of views on revelation, Divine Faith makes an original contribution to historiography and draws out hitherto unnoticed affinities between Catholic and Protestant thought. Re-examining the question from the beginning by asking how it is that the Christian (...) revelation is made, Lamont then looks at the fundamental philosophical issues concerning the nature of knowledge and the reasonableness of belief in testimony that are crucial to an understanding of Christian belief. Through theological considerations on the relations of grace and the church, and new advances in the philosophy of belief in testimony and how God speaks to communicate the Christian religion, this book offers an original and powerful account of the nature of Christian belief. (shrink)

Today’s international business environment is complicated by human rights abuses and social and economic repression in variouscountries. This paper introduces controversies with foreign investment in Burma to develop and describe alternative terms of global business engagement in ethically challenging settings. Two forms of engagement—unrestricted and constructive—and two forms of non-engagement—principled and sanctioned—are discussed. All four alternatives are examined for their ethical, social change, andcultural foundations. Additional considerations are posed in respect to constructive engagement, moral leadership by global businessexecutives, needs for (...) model building and evaluative research, and realities in the ethical context of global business. (shrink)

Aggleton & Brown (A&B) propose that the hippocampal-anterior thalamic and perirhinal-medial dorsal thalamic systems play independent roles in episodic memory, with the hippocampus supporting recollection-based memory and the perirhinal cortex, recognition memory. In this commentary we discuss whether there is experimental support for the A&B model from studies of long-term memory in semantic dementia.

History, more than other subjects, is confronted with the need to understand the nature of social time. Braudel, representing the objectivist approach, argued that there exists a universal objective world-time permeated by diverse tempi and rhythms. Althusser criticized this view by stating that each level within society has its own set of temporal relations. However, Althusser's argument requires not the rejection, but the further understanding of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In order for his concepts to have meaning, they must be based (...) on the meaningful intersubjective relationships of the participants. There is a gap between the philosophical concept of subjective meaning and historical practice. Four phenomenological ideal types of time&endash;synchronic, diachronic, specific, and eternal&endash;can be used to replace objective history with a "history" of times. (shrink)

This paper addresses what some view as a progressive and decades-long devaluing of the liberal arts in our educational institutions and society at large. It draws attention to symptoms of this trend and possible contributing factors, identifies benefits commonly attributed to the liberal arts, and then shows how insights from recent research on neuroplasticity provide good reason to believe that a traditional liberal education has positive effects on a person's brain. The paper supports the thesis that well-designed liberal arts courses (...) can literally transform students' minds and lives as a result of unique and synergistic brain processes activated and strengthened by the leaming experiences such courses provide. It finishes with recommendations to help reinvigorate and promote the value of liberal education. (shrink)

There is a biological controversy of long standing between proponents of the Wilsonian view that all organisms of a certain class have at least one part that is a cell and proponents of the contradictory, or Dobellian, view that some organisms in the same class have no parts that are cells. The controversy is considered from the standpoint of the methodology of explication. It is concluded that on the grounds of prevalent biological usage, precision, utility and generality the Wilsonian view (...) may be defended successfully against attacks that have been made upon it. (shrink)

One way to recast the problem of cultural explanation in historical inquiry is to distinguish two conceptualizations involving culture: cultural meanings as contents of signification that inform meaningful courses of action in historically unfolding circumstances; and cultural structures as institutionalized patterns of social life that may be elaborated in more than one concrete construction of meaning. This distinction helps to suggest how explanation can operate in accounting for cultural processes of meaning-formation, as well as in other ways that transcend specific (...) meanings, yet are nonetheless cultural. Examples of historical explanation involving each construct are offered, and their potential examined. (shrink)

A survey of Kant's philosophical writings reveals an ongoing concern with the problem of moral motivation. The problem is expressed thusly: How can a judgment of the understanding provide a motive sufficient to move the will to an action? ;Kant provides one line of argument in his formal writings on moral theory. The feeling of respect that follows from the recognition of the nobility of the universal moral law provides the motivation or incentive. Through this feeling we are aware that (...) we are beings that belong to an intelligible world that is independent of the mechanism of the sensible world. We are made aware of a higher, supersensible vocation and thus the sublimity of our own nature. ;There is another line of argument, however. A survey of Kant's philosophical writings also reveals a connection between the moral and the aesthetic. In the second Critique duty is called sublime; in his lectures on Ethics from the mid-1760's the feeling that results from free moral action is described as beautiful or sublime. In the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime the sublime is described as a "finer" feeling that moves us as we see the dignity of our own nature displayed in presentations of virtue. In the Critique of Judgment the feeling of the sublime is an experience that makes us aware of our supersensible vocation. Awareness of our supersensible nature through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure provides additional moral motivation and supports the incentive provided by the cognitive faculty's formulation of the moral law. ;A survey of Kant's philosophical writings and especially the unpublished lectures on Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics reveals a continuity in Kant's thought in terms of the relation between the moral and the aesthetic and in terms of concern with the problem of moral motivation. The third Critique was intended as the "keystone of the critical arch," but Kant apparently was not satisfied. The Opus postumum reveals the unity Kant was seeking: the supersensible and the sensible are united in the human person through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (shrink)

SummaryOn Kant's view, the moral individual cannot be “programmed” by sociological or educational techniques. To brainwash is to destroy freedom while to educate is to develop the capacity for freedom. Plato's proposal to invent mythic roots as incentives to moral conduct is not acceptable, since it involves not merely the propagation of falsehoods, but its success requires also a totalitarian state that destroys freedom. Not being concerned with mere legality, but with encouraging true morality, he has renounced forcing moral goodness.Marx, (...) Lenin, Stalin and Mao all proposed educational programs that put down the mythic roots of their secular religions. They project and indoctrinate into people's mind a new vision of society and man. The diabolical religion of National Socialism was inculcated by terror and totalitarianism.Kant's ethics has it mythic roots, too, which lie in Christian pietism. But his fully developed theory proscribes the use of any mythic religion not based on morality. (shrink)

Psikoloji, nörobiyoloji, felsefe ve diğer pek çok disiplinde benliğe ilişkin çok sayıda farklı problemler var. Nörobiyolojide, çalışılan benlik problemlerinin pek çoğunun patolojinin çeşitli formlarıyla ilgili olduğu izlenimine sahibim –dürüstlükteki sorunlar, tutarlılık veya benliğin işlevi. Bu patolojiler hakkında söyleyecek hiçbir şeyim yok çünkü neredeyse onlar hakkında hiçbir şey bilmiyorum. Ben bu patolojilere yalnızca ayrık-beyin hastaları gibi doğrudan benliğin problemleriyle ilgiliyseler değineceğim.

Peter Geach has claimed that St. Thomas Aquinas's first and second ways are instances of composition arguments, which argue from the parts of a thing having a property to the whole thing having that property. Such arguments are not universally valid, but are valid fr some properties. The paper examines composition arguments and the literature on them, and argues that a valid composition argument can be given for the existence of an uncaused cause of all effects.

MORAL THEORY is by no means unique in its dependence upon judgment for its application. Judgment is a creative faculty that stands as the active link between any theory and its application, whether it be a theory of science, morality, or aesthetics.

The metric known to be relevant for standard quantization procedures receives a natural interpretation and its explicit use simultaneously gives both physical and mathematical meaning to a (coherent-state) phase-space path integral, and at the same time establishes a fully satisfactory, geometric procedure of quantization.

The kind of expertise someone who specialises in ethics has, or indeed whether it makes sense to talk of moral expertise, is keenly debated and is a far from settled issue. It has been of interest to moral philosophers, partly because of the light it might shine on the nature of morality.1 2 It has also been debated within medical ethics, with some arguing against the idea that expertise in moral philosophy translates into ethical expertise and others arguing that skills (...) in ethical justification can be viewed as ethical expertise.3 4 This issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics includes a number of papers that demonstrate the importance of ethical expertise and some of the distinctive elements of it. Public involvement in research is seen in a number of countries as something valuable and in some, such as Australia, it can be a criterion for research grants. The UK National Standards for Public Involvement in Research are discussed in this issue of JME and McCoy et al provide a good illustration of why ethical expertise is important for framing public policy.5 The appeal of stakeholders having some say into research projects, particularly when they are funded via taxation is easy to understand, so who would not see public involvement as a good thing? However, McCoy et al claim that while there is a substantial and growing literature on public involvement in research that tends to emphasise the importance of public involvement, it doesn’t explain how or what this looks like when …. (shrink)